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Editor’s Note 
 
We are very pleased to present Volume 1: Issue 2 of the SCR. We have selected 
eight cases for review. In this issue we take a regional approach, analysing two 
ground-breaking decisions of the Kenyan and South African Apex Courts. We 
also survey a broad sampling of legal subject areas, ranging from Constitutional 
and Administrative Law, to Commercial Law and Intellectual Property.  
 
We lead with the ground breaking decision of the Supreme Court of Zambia in 
Esan v The Attorney General, a case that dealt with the deportation of a 
“prohibited immigrant” under the Immigration and Deportation Act of 2010. 
Turning our attention to Kenya, we comment on Raila Amolo Odinga and 
Another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission and Others, a 
Supreme Court decision nullifying the 2017 Presidential Election of that 
country. Moving to South Africa, we take a closer look at UDM v The Speaker, 
a Constitutional Court decision dealing with the powers of the Speaker of the 
National Assembly.  
 
Coming back to Zambia, we take a step back, and reflect on a decision that 
greatly impacted the trajectory of constitutionalism in the country: The Attorney 
General v Mutuna and Others, colloquially known as the case of the “Three 
Judges”. We then move on to examine the constitutionality of certain provisions 
in the Public Order Act, analysing Law Association of Zambia v The Attorney 
General.  
 
Moving further afield to the commercial arena, we examine Nyimba 
Investments Limited v Nico Insurance Zambia Limited, a recent Supreme Court 
decision that develops the concept of “insurable interest” quite significantly. 
Next, we turn our attention to DH Brothers Industries (PTY) Limited v Olivine 
Industries (PTY) Limited, a 2012 case that expounds on the status of 
unregistered trademarks. 
 
Finally, we end with a commentary on a recent case on prosecutorial discretion, 
Milford Maambo and Others v The People, decided by the Constitutional Court 
of Zambia.  
 
Given the diversity in our case selection, we hope that you our reader, will find 
a commentary that captures both your interest and imagination. 
 
Tinenenji Banda 
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Esan v.The Attorney General 
(Appeal No. 96/2014) [2016] ZMSC 255 
Nicholas Kahn-Fogel 
 
The Facts 
The Appellant, a British national, was the chief executive of Lafarge, South-
East Africa. He obtained a two-year work permit effective from February of 
2012. On December 3 2012, Zambian immigration officers detained the 
Appellant at Kenneth Kaunda International Airport on his return from a trip 
to Malawi. That evening, the Appellant was driven to Ndola. Officers 
denied the Appellant’s request to stop at his home to collect medicine, and 
they forbade him from using his telephone. On the trip to Ndola, the 
Appellant first learned of the purpose of his detention when officers gave 
him a document, signed by the Director General of Immigration, stating that 
his employment permit had been revoked on the grounds that he was “likely 
to be a danger to peace and good order in Zambia.”  
 
The government planned to put the Appellant on a flight from Ndola to 
Nairobi, but when the party arrived in Ndola, they learned that the flight had 
been delayed. The government then decided to put the Appellant on a flight 
to Johannesburg the following afternoon. While officers escorted him to that 
flight, they handed him a “Notice of Prohibited Immigrant to leave 
Zambia”. The notice, which was stamped 5 December 2012, informed the 
Appellant that he was a prohibited immigrant because his permit to remain 
in the country had expired or been revoked, and because the Minister of 
Home Affairs had declared in writing that his presence in Zambia was 
inimical to the public interest. The document was signed by an immigration 
officer, but not by the Minister. 
 
Procedural Posture 
After the Appellant unsuccessfully appealed to the Minister of Home 
Affairs to return to work pending a long-term settlement, the Appellant 
sought relief in the High Court on the ground that the Director General’s 
revocation of his work permit had been procedurally improper and 
irrational. Specifically, the Appellant argued that the Director General had 
failed to comply with Section 10 of the Immigration and Deportation Act, 
which requires the government to give at least forty-eight hours of notice, 
the reasons for the decision, and an opportunity to be heard to anyone 
adversely affected by an immigration decision, except for decisions relating 
to deportation and removal. This provision required the government to give 
Nicholas Kahn-Fogel 
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the Appellant such notice and the opportunity to be heard before revoking 
his work permit. The High Court condemned the government’s treatment of 
the Appellant and agreed that the Director General’s failure to provide the 
Appellant with forty-eight hours of notice and an opportunity to be heard, 
along with the reasons for the decision, before the revocation of his work 
permit, violated the Appellant’s rights under the Act. However, the High 
Court denied relief to the Appellant because it found the Minister’s 
declaration that Appellant’s presence in Zambia was inimical to the public 
interest superseded the violation by the Director General. Because the Act 
permits the Minister to make such decisions without explaining his reasons, 
and without requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard, the court held 
that the Appellant would have been subject to deportation even in the 
absence of the Director General’s actions. The Court noted that the 
Appellant could seek relief for his mistreatment using other processes of 
law, but that he was not entitled to an order quashing the decision of the 
Minister ordering him to leave Zambia. 
 
Issues on Appeal 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Appellant argued that; 1) the trial judge erred 
by finding the Director General’s revocation of the Appellant’s work permit was 
void for lack of the required notice, but then holding there was no nexus between 
that decision and the Minister’s “Notice to Prohibited Immigrant to Leave 
Zambia”; 2) that the trial judge had erred in holding that ordering relief against the 
Director General would serve no purpose, notwithstanding the breach in 
procedure; and 3) that the trial judge erred by abdicating his responsibility to 
adjudicate all issues in controversy when he opined that the Appellant could use 
“other processes of law” to seek redress for his mistreatment. 
 
The Holding 
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s upholding of the Minister’s 
decision, ruling that the removal of the Appellant from Zambia was unlawful. 
The crux of the Court’s holding was that, although the Immigration and 
Deportation Act permits the Minister of Home Affairs to declare a person’s 
presence in Zambia inimical to the public interest and to deport the person 
without explaining his reasons and without notice or an opportunity to be heard 
in advance, Section 35(2) of the Act requires the Minister to issue any such 
declaration in writing. Although an immigration officer had signed the “Notice 
of Prohibited Immigrant to Leave Zambia” that the Appellant received as he 
was escorted to his airplane, there was no document in evidence showing that 
the Minister himself had ever declared in writing that the Appellant’s presence 
Esan v.The Attorney General 
6 
in Zambia was inimical to the public interest. Thus, there was no lawful 
declaration by the Minister that could have superseded the Director General’s 
violation of Appellant’s statutory rights. 
 
The Court’s interpretation of the Act could have dispensed with the case on 
straightforward statutory grounds. The Court elaborated on its decision, 
however, by noting that the affront to the Appellant’s human rights, along 
with the potential for arbitrariness created by the Minister’s unfettered 
statutory discretion to declare a person’s presence inimical to the public 
interest, without even the requirement to articulate reasons for doing so, led 
the court to interpret the statute strictly. The Court repeatedly went beyond 
mere mechanical application of the statute to suggest its willingness to protect 
individual rights against government excess. The Court noted, for example, 
that despite the seemingly absolute discretion the statute conferred on the 
Minister, “Courts ought to be conscious of emerging trends towards a more 
open and transparent government that promote the rule of law, human rights 
and curb arbitrariness.” Therefore, a court “should go behind the orders and 
delve into the circumstances in which the power was exercised especially 
where there is prima facie evidence of arbitrariness or perverse actions, to 
ensure that it was exercised lawfully and within the confines of the law.”  
 
The Supreme Court went on to assert that, given the sequence of events and 
the inhumane treatment of the Appellant, the trial court should have 
“imputed bad faith and unreasonable exercise of power on the part of 
immigration authorities and granted the order of certiorari.” This finding 
supported the Court’s conclusion that there was, in fact, a nexus between 
the revocation of the Appellant’s work permit in violation of the Act and the 
“Notice to Prohibited Immigrant to Leave Zambia”, which invoked the 
Minister’s declaration that the Appellant’s presence in Zambia was inimical 
to the public interest. As the Court noted, the two documents were issued 
“more or less at the same time,” and the revocation of the permit triggered 
the chain of events. 
 
Given the Court’s finding that the government simply had not complied 
with the statute with regard to either the revocation of the permit or the 
Minister’s declaration, the Court’s identification of a nexus between the two 
decisions may have been unnecessary to its holding. It is unnecessary to 
conclude that illegitimate government conduct was causally related to an 
ostensibly valid, subsequent government act, if the subsequent act is 
illegitimate on its own terms. To use the terminology of American criminal 
Nicholas Kahn-Fogel 
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procedure, there is no need to characterize conduct as fruit of a poisonous 
tree if the conduct in question is poisonous in its own right. Here, because 
the government failed to comply with the requirement that the Minister 
provide a written declaration that the Appellant’s presence in Zambia was 
inimical to the public interest, there was no legitimate basis for deporting 
the Appellant that could have superseded the violation of his right to notice 
of the revocation of his work permit and, consequently, no need to 
demonstrate a nexus between the two decisions. 
 
While the Court took issue with the manner in which the Appellant 
formulated his second argument, and while it noted that his third argument 
was inapt in that the Appellant did not seek any alternative relief in the High 
Court, the Supreme Court’s ultimate conclusion gave the Appellant the 
relief he sought.  
 
Significance 
The Court’s holding provides welcome evidence of judicial independence 
and willingness to uphold individual rights and the rule of law against 
executive arbitrariness and excess. The opinion is impressive as well in its 
at times majestic description of the importance of exercising judicial power 
as a check on human rights abuses. As noted, the essence of the Court’s 
decision rested on what could have been characterized as a fairly mundane 
application of a clearly delineated statutory requirement; although the 
Minister of Home Affairs has statutory discretion to declare anyone’s 
presence in the country inimical to the public interest without notice or 
articulation of the reasons for the decision, the statute requires that the 
Minister make such a declaration in writing, and he did not do so in this 
case. It has long been recognized that legal directives formulated as 
precisely delineated rules can insulate judges against threats to their 
independence, for such directives leave the decision-maker with little 
discretion or room for manipulation. Yet the Court declined to rely only on 
a dry application of the statute to the facts. Instead, it clearly and 
courageously asserted its important role in protecting the human rights of all 
people in Zambia. 
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Raila Amolo Odinga and Another v Independent Electoral and 
Boundaries Commission and Others Presidential Petition No. 1 of 2017 
O’Brien Kaaba 
 
The Facts 
On the 8 August 2017, the Republic of Kenya held its second general 
election under the 2010 Constitution. On the 11 August 2017, the 
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) declared the 
incumbent, Uhuru Kenyatta, as the outright winner. Kenyatta garnered 
8,203,290 votes, beating his closest rival, Raila Odinga, who secured 
6,762,224 votes. Dissatisfied with the results, Odinga and his running mate, 
Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka, filed a petition challenging the election of 
Kenyatta in the Supreme Court of Kenya. 
The main issues for determination were as follows: 
a) Whether the 2017 presidential election was conducted in accordance 
with the principles laid down in the Constitution and the law relating 
to the elections; 
b) Whether there were irregularities and illegalities in the conduct of the 
2017 presidential election; 
c) If there were irregularities and illegalities, what impact, if any, these 
had on the integrity of the election; and 
d) What consequential orders, declarations and relief the Court should 
grant, if any. 
 
The Holding 
By a majority of four to two judges, the Court held that: 
a) The presidential election held on 8 August 2017 was not conducted in 
accordance with the Constitution and applicable law, rendering the 
declared result invalid, null and void; 
b) The irregularities and illegalities in the presidential election were 
substantial and significant, and affected the integrity of the election; 
c) Uhuru Kenyatta was not validly declared as president elect and that the 
declaration was invalid, null and void; and 
d) The IEBC should organize and conduct fresh presidential elections in 
strict conformity with the Constitution and applicable electoral laws 
within 60 days. 
O’Brien Kaaba 
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Significance 
The Supreme Court’s judgment is significant for at least four reasons. First, 
it reflects the first time that an African court has nullified a presidential 
election. Despite the numerous defective presidential elections that have 
been challenged in courts, African courts have until this decision evolved a 
jurisprudence that has upheld all presidential elections, regardless of the 
severity of anomalies proved. Judges in presidential election petitions have 
tended to see themselves not as handmaids of the rule of law but simply 
there to confirm the announced results. Perhaps this jurisprudence was best 
stated in the Ghanaian presidential election judgment of 2013 when the 
Supreme Court stated: 
 
For starters, I would state that the judiciary in Ghana, like its 
counterparts in other jurisdictions, does not readily invalidate a public 
election but often strives in public interest, to sustain it.1 
 
The Kenyan Supreme Court deviates from this jurisprudence and correctly 
restates the role of the Court, which is fidelity to the Constitution and the 
law, or as the Court rhetorically asked, “For what is the need of having a 
Constitution, if it is not respected?” The Kenyan decision concretely 
incarnates the often recited but rarely respected constitutional line: The 
Constitution is the supreme law of any country. 
 
The second important point about the judgment, and perhaps its greatest 
contribution to electoral jurisprudence in Africa, is its correct application of 
the “substantial effect” rule. Often election results are affected by honest 
mistakes, incompetence of election officials, corruption, fraud, violence, 
intimidation, and other irregularities. Some of these irregularities may be 
minor and inconsequential. However, many others are significant and bear 
on the fairness and legitimacy of an election. 
 
When courts are faced with an election petition, there is therefore a need for 
a legal device or mechanism to determine which irregularities are minor and 
inconsequential, and which are significant and in need of redress. The 
substantial effect rule does that. For many Anglophone African countries, 
this is an old rule inherited from the English legal system. The main point of 
                                                
1  See the majority judgment of Atuguba JSC in Nana Addo Dankwa-Addo and 
others vs. John Dramani Mahama and others No.J2/6/2013 Judgement of 29 
August 2013,.40 
Raila Amolo Odinga and Another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission and Others Presidential Petition No. 1 of 2017 
10 
the rule is that elections should not be nullified for minor irregularities or 
infractions of rules.2 
 
The rule is enacted in the English statute, the Representation of People Act, 
which has a history going back to the 1800s,3 stating that: 
 
No parliamentary election shall be declared invalid by reason of any 
act or omission by the returning officer or any other person in breach 
of his official duty in connection with the election or otherwise of the 
parliamentary election rules if it appears to the tribunal having 
cognizance of the question that:- 
(a) The election was so conducted as to be substantially in 
accordance with the law as to the elections; and  
(b) The act or omission did not affect its results.4 
 
The idea behind the rule is that trivial mistakes, omissions and commissions 
should not lead to the annulment of an election, provided that the overall fairness 
of the election was not vitiated. Lord Denning identified three strands to this rule: 
1. If the election was conducted so badly that it was not substantially in 
accordance with the law as to elections, the election is vitiated, 
irrespective of whether the result was affected or not. 
 
2. If the election was so conducted that it was substantially in accordance with 
the law as to elections, it is not vitiated by a breach of the rules or a mistake 
at the polls - provided that it did not affect the results of the election. 
 
3.  If the election was conducted substantially in accordance with the law as to 
elections, but there was nevertheless a breach of the rules or a mistake at the 
polls that did affect the results, then the election is vitiated.5 
 
In Africa, the substantial effect rule has worked in the most disingenuous 
way to uphold elections fraught with major irregularities and fraud. Two 
                                                
2  See John Fitch vs. Tom Stephenson and others Case No.M324/107[2008]EWHC 
501(QB) [38] 
3  See Eggers and Spirling “The Judicialisation of Electoral Dispute Resolution: 
Partisan Bias and Bipartisan Reform in 19th Century Britain”, 2-8  
4  Representation of the People Act 1983, Section 23(3). See also Section 48 of the 
same Act. 
5  Morgan vs. Simpson [1975] 1QB 151 
O’Brien Kaaba 
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examples can be given to illustrate the point. The first relates to the 
Ugandan case of Kizza Besigye vs. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni.6 This petition 
was brought by the main opposition losing candidate, Dr. Kizza Besigye, 
challenging the election of the incumbent, President Museveni, following 
the February 2006 election. The Presidential Elections Act states: 
 
The election of a candidate as a president shall only be annulled on 
any of the following grounds, if proved to the satisfaction of the court: 
(a) …that the election was not conducted in accordance with the 
principles laid down in those provisions and that the non-compliance 
affected the results of the election in a substantial manner.7  
 
At the hearing of the petition, the issues for decision by the Supreme Court 
of Uganda were: 
1. Whether there was non-compliance with the provisions of the 
Constitution, Presidential Elections Act and Electoral Commission 
Act, in the conduct of the 2006 presidential election; 
 
2. Whether the election was not conducted in accordance with principles 
laid down in the Constitution, Presidential Elections Act and Electoral 
Commission Act; 
 
3. Whether, if either of the first or second issues were answered in the 
affirmative, such non-compliance with the said laws and principles 
affected the results of the election in a substantial manner; and  
 
4. Whether the alleged illegal practices or any electoral offences in the 
petition were committed by the president personally, or by his agents 
with his knowledge and consent or approval.8 
 
With respect to the first two issues (whether there was non-compliance or 
failure to conduct the election in accordance with the law), the Supreme Court 
judges were unanimous that the election was vitiated by the disenfranchisement 
of voters. A number of illegalities were cited: the unlawful deletion of names 
                                                
6  Presidential Election Petition No.01 of 2006 
7  Presidential Election Act, Section 59(6)(a) 
8  See the majority judgment of Odoki CJ in Kizza Besigye vs. Yoweri Kaguta 
Museveni Presidential Election Petition No.1 of 2006 
Raila Amolo Odinga and Another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission and Others Presidential Petition No. 1 of 2017 
12 
from the voters’ register; wrongful counting and tallying of results; bribery; 
intimidation; violence; multiple voting; and ballot stuffing.9  
 
On the third issue, however (whether the election results were affected), by 
a majority of four to three, the Court held that the failure to comply with the 
provisions and principles in the statutes did not affect the election in a 
substantial manner.10 On the fourth issue, by a majority of five to two, the 
Court held that, although there were illegal practices and other offences, 
these were not committed by the President or his agents nor were they 
committed with his knowledge or approval.11 
 
The third issue (substantial effect), however, was the main issue around 
which the petition revolved and was mainly resolved. The majority 
dismissed the petition, holding that in determining if the irregularities and 
malpractices affected the results in a substantial manner, numbers were the 
sole measuring yardstick. Since in terms of votes garnered, the gap between 
the winner and the runner up could not be bridged even if the anomalies 
were taken into account, the court could not tamper with the results.  
 
The second example is the Zambian case of Anderson Kambela Mazoka and 
others vs. Levy Patrick Mwanawasa and others.12 The case was brought 
following the 2001 Zambian general elections. The Supreme Court admitted 
that there were many flaws in the electoral process, including the use of the 
national intelligence in a partisan way, the unlawful use of public resources by 
the incumbent party and abuse of resources from parastatal companies.13 
These anomalies notwithstanding, the Supreme Court held that it could not 
grant any remedy or interfere with the result of the election because, taking 
into account the national character of the presidential election, “where the 
whole country formed a single electoral college,” it could not be said that the 
proven “defects were such that the majority of the voters were prevented from 
electing the candidate whom they preferred.”14 In the view of the court, the 
petitioners were supposed to prove that the flaws “seriously affected the 
result” to such an extent that it could no longer be viewed as the true 
                                                
9  Ibid, 5. 
10  Ibid, 5. 
11  Ibid, 5. 
12  (2005) ZR, 18. 
13  Anderson Kambela Mazoka and others vs. Levy Patrick Mwanawasa and others 
in (2005) ZR, Ibid138. 
14  Ibid, 119. 
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reflection of the majority of the voters.15 To demonstrate this, the petitioners 
should have proved “electoral malpractices and violations of the electoral 
laws in at least a majority of the constituencies.”16 
 
In contrast to the Mazoka decision, the Kenyan decision demonstrates that it 
is not only what happens on polling day that matters, but the entire process. 
Elections, as the Court correctly observed, “are not events but processes”. It 
was the process of the 2017 Kenyan election — and in particular the use of 
the country’s new electoral management system — that led the Court to 
invalidate the result.  
 
Prior to the 2017 Kenyan election, the Elections Act was amended to introduce 
the Kenya Integrated Electoral Management System (KIEMS). This system was 
intended to be used in the biometric voter registration and, on polling day, for 
voter identification. The system was also to be used to transmit election results 
from polling stations simultaneously to the Constituency Tallying Centre and 
the National Tallying Centre. The transmission of results required the use of 
standard forms (Forms 34A and 34B).  
 
In practice, however, the transmission of results was not done as required by 
the law. No plausible explanation was given by the IEBC for this. The 
petitioners alleged that the system was hacked and results tampered with in 
favour of the incumbent. The Court appointed its own IT experts to assess 
the IEBC servers and report their findings to the Court. IEBC, in violation 
of the Court order, declined to give the Court appointed IT experts access to 
critical areas of the server. 
 
The Court held that the failures by IEBC were a clear violation of the Constitution 
and the Elections Act, and caused serious doubt as to whether the election results 
could be said to be a free expression of the will of the people as required by the 
Constitution. The Court declined to take what has been the easy way out by many 
African courts, as urged by the defendants. That easy way out was to state that 
even if all the anomalies were taken into account, in terms of numbers, the gap 
between the declared winner and the runner up was too big to be bridged. It held 
that elections are not just about numbers, but that in order to gauge whether the 
result reflects the will of the people, the quality of the entire process must be taken 
into account. In the words of the Court:  
                                                
15 Ibid, 18. 
16 Ibid 
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“Even in numbers, we used to be told in school that to arrive at a 
mathematical solution, there is always a computation path one has to 
take, as proof that the process indeed gives rise to the stated solution.” 
 
The third important point about the Kenyan court’s judgment in Odinga 
relates to consequences for disobeying a court order in the process of 
adjudicating a disputed presidential election. Courts in Africa have generally 
dealt with officials or incumbent candidates who disobey court orders in a 
timid way. In the Nigerian case of Muhammadu Buhari and others vs. 
Olusegun Obasanjo and others,17 for example, the losing candidate, 
Muhammadu Buhari, sought and was granted an injunction by the court 
restraining the then President and his running mate from presenting 
themselves for swearing-in into office, pending the determination of the main 
election petition.18 The respondents, in violation of the court order, proceeded 
with a purported swearing-in, and the applicants appealed to the Supreme 
Court to determine the validity of the swearing-in when it was done in 
violation of a valid court order. The Supreme Court held that the application 
was no longer of any relevance since the respondents were already sworn-in 
and, therefore, any injunction granted by the Court would simply be an 
academic exercise, with no res or status quo to protect.19 Amazingly, the acts 
taken by the President in violation of the court order were the same acts that 
insulated him from any consequences and secured his position in power. 
 
By contrast, the Kenyan decision in Odinga demonstrates that disobeying a 
court order should have adverse consequences. The Kenyan Supreme Court 
in the course of the petition had appointed independent IT experts and 
ordered IEBC to give them access to the servers in order to independently 
determine whether the system had been hacked. IEBC, however, 
“contumaciously disobeyed the order,” leading the Court to draw an adverse 
inference against IEBC, and to accept the petitioners’ claim that “either 
IEBC’s IT system was infiltrated and compromised and the data therein 
interfered with or IEBC’s officials themselves interfered with the data….” 
The fourth and final point of significance of the Odinga decision relates to the 
Court’s statement regarding election observation. It often happens that observers 
trivialize some anomalies or, without observing the entire electoral process, certify 
an election as credible. This often gives a veneer of legitimacy to frequently 
                                                
17 133/2003 17 NWLR (2003) 
18  Ibid, 3. 
19  Ibid, 5. 
O’Brien Kaaba 
15 
 
spurious election results. For example, the European Union (EU) Observation 
Mission to Zambia’s 2016 elections acknowledged that it was unable to observe 
the transmission and tallying of national results and further observed that: 
 
The aggregation of results was conducted according to procedure in 
only 61 per cent of cases observed. In some instances, presiding 
officers did not stay throughout the processing of the material for their 
polling station, and returning officers did not always announce results, 
nor regularly print copies of the record of proceedings of the vote 
tabulation. The announcement of results form was not posted outside 
the totalling centre in 22 per cent of cases.20 
 
Yet, the EU went ahead and certified the election results as reflecting the 
will of the people. The Kenyan Supreme Court rightly frowned upon this 
kind of election observation. In the case of Kenya, all the major 
international election observers certified the election as credible, or largely 
reflecting the will of the people. These conclusions were entirely based on 
what was observable on polling day, without taking into account the 
transmission of results. The Court had this to say:  
 
In passing only, we must also state that whereas the role of observers 
and their interim reports were heavily relied upon by the respondents 
as evidence that the electoral process was free and fair, the evidence 
before us points to the fact that hardly any of the observers 
interrogated the process beyond counting and tallying at the polling 
stations. The interim reports cannot therefore be used to authenticate 
the transmission and eventual declaration of results. 
 
Ultimately, the judgment is not only ground breaking but also a breath of 
fresh air for African electoral jurisprudence. The decision demonstrates an 
unalloyed and unwavering commitment to constitutionalism and the rule of 
law. It is only through such principled adjudication that African courts can 
promote a course of development anchored on respect for human rights, 
accountability and the rule of law. As the court stated, the greatness of any 
nation lies not in the might of its armies but in “fidelity to the Constitution 
and strict adherence to the rule of law.”
                                                
20  European Union Election Observation Mission, Final Report Republic of 
Zambia General Elections and Referendum 11 August 2016 (2016), 6 and 33. 
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United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and 
Others (CCT89/17) [2017] ZACC 21 
Tinenenji Banda 
The Facts 
On 31 March 2017, South African President Jacob Zuma, in exercise of his 
constitutional powers, dismissed the Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, 
and his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas. The South African market reacted sharply to 
these dismissals, and an economic downgrade to junk status took effect 
shortly thereafter. In light of the economic downgrade, three opposition 
political parties, the United Democratic Movement (UDM), the Democratic 
Alliance, and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) approached the 
Speaker of the National Assembly Baleka Mbete, requesting her to schedule 
a motion of no confidence in President Zuma. Mbete obliged, and scheduled 
the motion for the 18 April 2017. 
 
Twelve days before the motion was to be tabled, the UDM wrote a letter to 
Mbete, asking that she mandate a secret ballot for the motion. In support of 
this request, the UDM asserted that the motion was of obviously high 
importance, and that the public interest necessitated the guarantee of a truly 
“democratic outcome”, which could only be achieved, it was argued, 
through a secret ballot. An open ballot would in the UDM’s view, limit the 
free will of members, since some members of the House, fearing career 
reprisals and other adverse repercussions, might be intimidated into voting 
against the motion. 
 
In responding to the request, Mbete proffered that neither the Constitution 
nor the Rules of the National Assembly made provision for the prescribing 
of a secret ballot for a motion of no confidence vote. In arriving at her 
decision, she relied on the 2015 High Court Decision of Tlouamma v 
Speaker of the National Assembly. In Tloumanna, the High Court had held 
that the South African Constitution did not expressly or impliedly require a 
secret ballot for motions of no confidence in the President. On the strength 
of that case, and based on her interpretation of the Constitution and the 
National Assembly Rules, the Speaker concluded that she lacked the legal 
authority to prescribe a secret ballot for the motion. 
 
Unpersuaded by the Speaker’s reasoning, the UDM petitioned the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa to determine whether the Constitution 
of the Republic and the Rules of the National Assembly did in fact bar the 
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Speaker from prescribing a secret ballot for a motion of no confidence in the 
President. If it was to be the Court’s finding that the Speaker was not so 
proscribed, the UDM asked the court to mandate the Speaker to prescribe a 
secret ballot for the no confidence motion.  
 
The Holding 
The elegant, unanimous judgment, was delivered by Chief Justice Mogoeng 
Mogoeng. Justice Mogoeng began his judgment by underscoring the fact 
that as a constitutional democracy, the South African government was a 
government “of the people, by the people and for the people”. He added that 
since constitutional democracies do not self-actualize, it was the 
responsibility of governmental institutions and structures to turn the 
aspirations of the people into a reality. Noting that fifty five million people 
cannot collectively govern the Republic, he acknowledged that governance 
“by the people” was a legal fiction, noting further that the impracticalities of 
collective governance compelled the people to assign governance functions 
to “servants” and “messengers” who, in the exercise of these functions, 
should have the welfare of all South Africans foremost in mind.  
 
Justice Mogoeng then went on to observe that because public officials wield 
so much power, these agents must have an unwavering loyalty to the 
constitutional values of accountability and openness, and that those values 
were in part superintended by Parliament, to whom the President, Deputy 
President, Ministers and Deputy Ministers were enjoined to report. The 
responsibility of supervising the performance of the President and his 
cabinet, the Chief Justice pronounced, fell squarely on the National 
Assembly. Parliament’s oversight function, according to the Court, was to 
ensure that the power and resources entrusted to the executive were used in 
a justifiable way. 
 
The Court proceeded to suggest that there might come a time when “all the 
regular checks and balances seem to be ineffective”, and that at such a time, 
the best interests of the nation may require resort to the use of the “ultimate 
accountability ensuring mechanisms” of which there are three: (i) the 
removal of office through the ballot box; (ii) ‘impeachment’; and (iii) a 
successful motion of no confidence. The threat of these mechanisms and 
their severe repercussions, the Court opined, were intended to serve as 
constant reminders to the President and his cabinet, that mishandling of 
public power and resources might inflict severe repercussions on those who 
so offend. 
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As to Parliament’s specific oversight responsibilities, the Chief Justice 
focused on section 55(1) of the Constitution, which provides that: 
The National Assembly must provide for mechanisms 
(a) to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere 
of government are accountable to it; and 
(b) to maintain oversight of— 
(i) the exercise of national executive authority, including the 
implementation of legislation; and  
(ii) any organ of state. 
 
In specific reference to motions of no confidence, Mogoeng went on to cite 
Section 102 of the Constitution, which declares: 
(1) If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a majority of its 
members, passes a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet excluding 
the President, the President must reconstitute the Cabinet.  
(2) If the National Assembly, by a vote supported by a majority of its 
members, passes a motion of no confidence in the President, the 
President and the other members of the Cabinet and any Deputy 
Ministers must resign.  
 
Reiterating the severity of a motion of no confidence, the Chief Justice 
emphasized that a successful no confidence vote in the President was the 
most severe sanction that Parliament could impose on a sitting President, 
and as such, was the outer limit of Parliament’s supervisory function.  
 
The Court then went on to decide the question that triggered the case, 
namely, whether the Speaker of the National Assembly has power to 
prescribe a secret ballot. The Court noted that in light of section 57 which 
empowers the National Assembly to determine its own procedures and 
arrangements, the Constitution’s failure to prescribe the conduct of a no 
confidence vote was deliberate. The Court held further that Parliament’s 
freedom in this regard was limited only by the requirement that whatever 
rules and procedures Parliament puts in place, must support, in the Chief 
Justice’s own words, the advancing of the “constitutional project.”  
 
The Court then examined the National Assembly Rules, focusing in 
particular on rule 104(1), which empowers the Speaker to prescribe the 
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voting procedure that must be used when a manual voting system is used. 
The import of Rule 104, the Court held, is that the procedure that the 
Speaker prescribes, will determine if a vote is conducted by secret ballot or 
not. In other words, the question of whether voting is conducted by secret or 
open ballot, is a discretionary decision that the Rules of Parliament 
empower the Speaker to make. In making this judgment call, the Court held 
that the Speaker should be guided by the outcome which best ensures that 
“members exercise their oversight powers most effectively.” Ultimately, the 
Court ruled, the Speaker was labouring under a misapprehension when she 
determined that she lacked the power to prescribe a secret vote.  
 
After disposing of the first question, the Court then went on to determine 
the second issue: namely, whether the Court could compel the Speaker to 
prescribe a secret ballot for the no confidence vote against the President. 
The Court held that compelling the Speaker to prescribe a particular voting 
procedure would violate the separation of powers principle, since this is a 
power entrusted only to the Speaker, and the Speaker alone. The Court 
therefore left the decision of whether the motion of no confidence vote 
should be held by secret or open ballot in the hands of the Speaker.  
 
Significance  
In holding that the Speaker did in fact have the power to prescribe voting 
procedures, the Court, in one fell swoop, exercised a decisive check on both 
Parliament and the Executive. For Parliament, the check came in the form 
of this reminder: the supervisory powers bestowed on Parliament by the 
Republican Constitution, are not to be hollow and unrealizable. Instead, 
procedures that ensure that the “ultimate accountability ensuring 
mechanisms” can in fact actualize, should be put in place by those 
responsible for doing so. In this respect, the Court reminded the Speaker 
that the South African Constitution and the Rules of the National Assembly 
empower her to prescribe procedures that best enable Parliament to realize 
its oversight responsibility.  
 
For the Executive, the check came in the form of this caution: when 
ordinary checks and balances fail to reign them in, the most fatal of 
sanctions will wield a lethal sword to curtail the abuse.  
 
Of particular significance is the fact that even while acting as a check on 
others, the Court acknowledged that it too was constrained, and was 
therefore careful not to overstep its own boundaries. While the Court 
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stopped short of impinging on the domain of the Speaker, the Court did 
offer significant guidance on how the Speaker must go about determining 
parliamentary voting procedure, holding in part that: “[t]here must always 
be a proper and rational basis for whatever choice the Speaker makes in the 
exercise of the constitutional power to determine the voting procedure” and 
further that “[d]ue regard must always be had to real possibilities of 
corruption as well as [whether] the prevailing circumstances…allow 
Members to exercise their vote in a manner that does not expose them to 
illegitimate hardships.” The Speaker, the Court held, must have regard to 
the prevailing atmosphere in Parliament, and whether the atmosphere is 
“peaceful”, “toxified’ or “highly charged”, should all be relevant inputs in 
the decision-making process.  
 
In UDM v the Speaker, the Court displayed in full force and with expert 
precision, the important oversight function that the judiciary plays in a 
constitutional democracy. While the primary recipient of that oversight 
function in this particular case was Parliament, the Executive was both 
cautioned and reminded, that when exercised on behalf of the people, public 
power must be exercised in a judicious, controlled, and justifiable manner.  
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Attorney General v Mutuna and Others 
(Appeal No. 088/2012) [2013] ZMSC 38 1 
Muna Ndulo 
 
The Facts 
On the 30 April 2012, two High Court Judges, Judges Mutuna and 
Kajimanga, and one Supreme Court Judge, Judge Musonda, received a letter 
from then-President Michael Sata, suspending them from their duties. The 
letter informed the three judges that he, the President, had set up a tribunal 
pursuant to Article 98(5) of the Constitution, to inquire into the unspecified 
conduct of the three. The letter directed that the judges “cease acting” as 
judges until the Tribunal concluded its proceedings. On the same day, the 
President held a press conference, stating that he had received “credible 
complaints” against the three judges and had therefore decided to constitute 
a tribunal to investigate the complaints. 
 
Two judges, Mutuna and Kajimanga, filed an ex parte application for leave 
to apply for Judicial Review of the President’s decision. Ultimately, the 
applicants sought the quashing of the President’s decision, contending that 
the suspension had been made without recourse to Article 91 (2) of the 
Constitution of Zambia and the Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act. Leave was 
granted. Following the successful application, Judge Philip Musonda 
applied to be joined to the proceedings. His application was granted. 
 
On 17 May 2012, the Attorney General took out summons to discharge the 
leave obtained by the Applicants, arguing that the President had acted 
within his constitutional powers, without procedural impropriety, and 
without unreasonableness. The Attorney General argued further that the 
Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act was subordinate to Article 98 of the 
Constitution on which the President relied, and could therefore not “be used 
to fetter the Republican President’s power under the Constitution.” 
 
The Trial Court did not discharge the leave, ruling that there were matters 
ripe for further investigation, including the question of whether Article 98 
should be read and understood in tandem with Article 91 and the Judicial 
                                                
1  This case was decided before the Constitutional Amendment of 2016. The 
provisions cited in this commentary are the pre-amendment Constitutional 
provisions.  
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(Code of Conduct) Act. The Attorney General appealed to the Supreme 
Court.  
 
The Holding 
Adopting the doctrine of Executive Supremacy, the Court held that in 
enacting Article 98, Parliament intended to make it “possible for the 
President as Head of State to deal with that exclusive class of adjudicators 
without recourse to the Judicial Complaints Authority.”  
 
Holding that Article 98 was “very clear” and “unambiguous”, the Court 
adopted a literal interpretative method, arguing that adopting any other 
approach would be to “amend” Article 98 through interpretation. Using a 
literal approach, the Court went on to hold that there was no constitutional 
provision to support an “interplay” between Article 98 on the one hand, and 
Article 91 and the Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act on the other. In the 
Court’s view, these were “stand alone” provisions. The framers of the 
Constitution, so the Court argued, “never intended for the powers vested in 
the President to be diluted through the route of the Judicial (Code of 
Conduct) Act or through the Chief Justice.”  
 
Deciding on whether the President’s conduct was unreasonable, the Court 
uttered these words: 
 
Bearing in mind the authoritative position of His Excellency, it would 
be illogical and unreasonable to hold that he did not receive credible 
information as President for him to act as he did. He [the President] is 
the overall authority on everything. His sources are exclusive to the 
public domain and must be impeccable. [Emphasis ours]. 
 
Finally, on the question of natural justice for the three judges, the Court held 
that since the suspended judges would have the opportunity to be heard 
before the tribunal, the setting up of the tribunal did not violate “open 
justice principles”. 
 
Significance 
This commentary argues that the doctrine of “executive supremacy”, which 
the Zambian Supreme Court adopted in this case, has no place in a 
constitutional democracy. A jurisprudence of constitutionalism differs in 
fundamental respects from a jurisprudence of “executive supremacy”. The 
former is premised on the supremacy of the Constitution. Additionally, 
Muna Ndulo 
23 
 
constitutionalism is premised upon the separation of powers of the three 
arms of the government. The stability of the nation hinges on respect for the 
rule of law which is the cornerstone of the separation of powers principle. 
Fundamental to the separation of powers principle, is the unassailable 
independence of the judiciary. There must therefore be entrenched 
safeguards to ensure judicial independence, chief among which are proper 
standards that prevent the arbitrary and baseless removal of judicial officers.  
 
To allow the judiciary to perform its duties fearlessly and impartially, the 
Constitution grants the judiciary independence from the other two arms of 
government. Article 91 (2) states that: “the judges, magistrates and justices of 
the courts mentioned in clause (1) shall be independent, impartial and subject 
only to this Constitution and the law and shall conduct themselves in 
accordance with a code of conduct promulgated by Parliament.” Article 98 
provides for ways to remove a judge from office. It provides that a judge may 
be removed from office only for inability to perform the functions of his or 
her office, whether arising from infirmity of body or mind or for misconduct, 
and shall not be so removed except in accordance with the provisions of that 
Article. The Article further provides that if the President considers that the 
question of removing a judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court under 
Article 98 ought to be investigated, (a) he shall appoint a tribunal which shall 
consist of a Chairman and not less two other members who have held high 
judicial office; and (b) the Tribunal shall inquire into the matter and report on 
the facts thereof to the President and advise the President whether the judge 
ought to be removed from office under the Article.  
 
Articles 91 and 98 are without a doubt, interconnected. Article 91 provides 
the overall context within which provisions relating to the judiciary should 
be interpreted. It underscores judicial independence. Article 98 is not a 
conduit of executive influence over the judiciary and no interpretation that 
supports this is valid. The removal of judges from the bench on spurious 
grounds is the greatest threat to judicial independence. There is no 
assurance of a judge’s independence if he or she can easily be removed 
from office. Where judges can easily be removed, it would require fearless 
men and women of the strongest will and moral fibre to do justice where the 
interests of the reigning political party are at stake. To safeguard the 
independence of the judiciary granted in Article 91, Article 98 provides that 
a judge can be removed on only two grounds: (1) inability to discharge the 
functions of office or (2) misconduct. 
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International standards applicable to the preservation of the independence of 
the judiciary amply warn against the improper removal of judges from 
office. They insist that a judge who faces removal must be examined by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, and that the grounds of removal must be 
limited to the two cases mentioned above; inability to perform one’s 
functions, and misconduct. The Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act of 1999 
states in the clearest of terms that it was enacted to provide for the code of 
conduct for officers of the judicature pursuant to Article 91 of the 
Constitution. The trial judge was correct when she suggested that there is an 
interplay between articles 91(2) and the Judicial Code of Conduct on one 
hand, and articles 98(2) (3) and (5) on the other. The procedures set up 
under the Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act were put in place to ensure that 
the process of removing judges established under Article 98 does not 
compromise judicial independence, and undermine the right to due process. 
The interplay ensures that the President cannot, without the approval of the 
Chief Justice, initiate the process to remove a judge from office. In this way, 
the judiciary overseas the removal process. The rationale of this approach is 
that the Chief Justice will advise the President only in those circumstances 
where it is reasonable and justifiable for an investigation to be conducted. 
Without this check, it is impossible to ensure that the President does not 
appoint a tribunal that he or she can manipulate to achieve a predetermined 
outcome. Additionally, the complaints procedures established under the 
Judicial (Code of Conduct) Act protect a judge’s due process rights by 
enabling the judge to defend himself or herself before a complaints hearing 
before a Tribunal is appointed. 
 
The argument that Article 98 provides the President unfettered power to 
check the judiciary as the majority opines is to say the least, unbelievable. 
That thinking completely undermines and offends the doctrine of the 
separation of powers. Further, by construing Article 98 as a stand-alone 
provision, the court ignores the fact that there is a context to Article 98. 
Neither the Constitution nor the procedures prescribe in the Judicial (Code 
of Conduct) Act could have contemplated that the position of a judge be as 
vulnerable as the majority would want us to believe. If the Constitution had 
wanted to vest this power in the complete discretion of the President, the 
Constitution could easily have used words to that effect. The Constitution 
does not say misconduct “in the opinion of the President.” It says rather, “If 
the President considers the question of removing a judge of the Supreme 
Court or of the High Court under this Article ought to be investigated.” That 
means there has to be an objective criteria on which the question is based 
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otherwise the President is acting arbitrarily. It is correct to say that the 
determination of whether a judge is unfit for office or is guilty of 
misconduct stipulated in Article 98 involves a value judgment. But it does 
not follow that this decision and evaluation lies within the sole and 
subjective preserve of the President. Value judgments are involved in 
virtually every decision any member of the Executive might make where 
objective requirements are stipulated. It is also true that there may be 
differences of opinion in relation to whether or not objective criteria have 
been established or are present. This does not mean that the decision 
becomes one of subjective determination, immune from objective scrutiny. 
 
The argument that the powers under Article 98 are investigative and not 
executive is disingenuous. Equity looks at substance rather than form. What 
remedy can there be for a judge if the Tribunal recommends dismissal? 
Should the judge wait until the Tribunal has concluded its work to institute 
judicial review of the President’s action to appoint a Tribunal? It is a 
betrayal of the sacred duty of doing justice entrusted to judges if the judges 
take such an obviously naive view of the law and declare executive action to 
be exempt from scrutiny by the courts. Our courts must regard themselves 
as courts of justice, not merely courts of law narrowly defined, especially 
where human freedom and dignity are concerned. In the words of former 
US President Andrew Jackson, “[a]ll the rights secured to the citizens under 
the Constitution are worth nothing, and a mere bubble, except guaranteed to 
them by an independent and virtuous Judiciary.” 
 
A judge should not, and cannot afford to subject himself or herself to a mere 
mechanical application of the law but must feel called upon to higher duties. 
In any event, in this particular case, it was unnecessary to decide whether 
the decision by the President constituted investigative or administrative 
action because even in terms of the former, rationality is a requirement for 
the validity of executive action under the principle of legality. The United 
Nations Human Rights Committee has said that the principle of legality and 
the rule of law are inherent in the International Covenant for Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has 
also stressed that there exists an inseparable bond between the principle of 
legality, democratic institutions and the rule of law. 
 
The majority opinion held that the appropriate way to interpret Article 98 was 
through the method of the “literal rule of interpretation.” According to the 
majority, the literal rule requires the court to give the ordinary grammatical 
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meaning to provisions in constitutional texts. This approach is contrary to the 
view held by other courts elsewhere in the Commonwealth. It is also 
intellectually deficient and can lead to bizarre outcomes. Does the majority 
suggest that our Constitution does not subscribe to any values that it seeks to 
reflect and advance? In any event, Article 91 and Article 98 need 
interpretation. How for example, do you reconcile the independence of the 
judiciary with an easy process of removal of judges from the bench? How do 
you reconcile the doctrine of the separation of powers and removal of judges 
by a system initiated and controlled by the executive without any opportunity 
for scrutiny? Further, Article 98 states that a judge can be removed for 
“inability to discharge the functions of his office or for misconduct”. To an 
ordinary layman these may appear to be clear terms. But far from being clear, 
they are in fact nebulous. All these matters require reconciliation by the 
Supreme Court in ways that do not undermine the core purposes of the 
Constitution. In a Constitution there are some unambiguous provisions, for 
example, the number of members of Parliament that because of the clear and 
unambiguous meaning of the text, render these clear-cut provisions amenable 
to a literal interpretation and do not therefore require the application of a 
sophisticated theory of constitutional interpretation to reach a sensible 
conclusion. On the other hand, there are provisions of the Constitution where 
the text itself is so abstract or ambiguous that analysis of the text and 
sometimes the history, the structure, purpose, and intent of the relevant 
provision is absolutely necessary. 
 
The purposeful approach to interpretation invites more active judicial 
intermediation and interpretation. In particular, it demands that judges 
interpreting a constitutional text not only consult the spirit of the law but also 
endeavour to harmonize the letter with the spirit. To do this, the judges must 
bring to their reasoning and decisions a clear understanding of the overarching 
values and philosophical foundations of a liberal democracy; of the social, 
economic, and political evaluation of their country; and of the historical 
antecedents and contemporary purposes of the particular provision in dispute. 
The values of democracy, transparency, accountability and good governance 
are particularly relevant in the interpretation of Article 91 and 98. 
 
The existence of an independent and impartial judiciary is at the heart of 
Articles 91 and 98. The two Articles attempt to ensure that the justice 
system is truly independent from other branches of the state. Different 
organs of the state have exclusive and specific responsibilities. By virtue of 
this separation, it is not permissible for any branch of power to interfere 
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with the sphere of the other. An interpretation of Article 98 that holds that 
the decision to institute a tribunal is a matter for the President’s subjective 
opinion alone and cannot be questioned by any court of law is not in 
keeping with the Constitution. An interpretation that requires the existence 
of objective jurisdictional facts before the appointment of a Tribunal is more 
consistent and in keeping with the constitutional guarantee of the 
independence of the judiciary. 
 
The Supreme Court in its judgment exhibited excessive deference to the 
Executive. As a result, alarming statements were made by the majority, to 
wit, the President “is the overall authority on everything” and “his sources 
are exclusive to the public domain and must be impeccable.” The level of 
grovelling exhibited by the Court in this case is shocking. How can a Court 
possibly determine, without scrutiny, that a President’s sources of 
information are impeccable? Is the Court telling us that it has a secret 
method of finding this out? If it has, is that method legal and transparent? 
As Lord Denning warned, when the state defends its actions by pleading 
national interest and privileged information, it is the end of liberty, and in 
this case, the end of constitutionalism. 
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Law Association of Zambia v. the Attorney General 
(Appeal No. 8/2014) [2016] ZMSC 243.  
Muna Ndulo and Samuel Ndungu 
 
The Facts  
This appeal concerned the constitutionality of Sections 5 and 6 of the Public 
Order Act. The Law Association of Zambia had unsuccessfully argued in 
the High Court that these Sections violated Articles 20 and 21 of the 
Constitution of Zambia, which provide for the protection of freedom of 
expression and the protection of freedom of assembly and association. The 
appeal sought to overturn the decision of the High Court. 
 
The Holding  
The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that the Public Order Act, 
as amended by Act No. 36 of 1996 is constitutional. The Court opined that 
the amendment had addressed the concerns expressed in the Mulundika 
judgment – namely, that the police cannot deny permits to people who apply 
to hold a public demonstration. The Court however found that Section 5 (6) 
of the Act fell short of the constitutional threshold, as it does not give the 
police an obligation to suggest a “reasonable alternative date in the very 
near future”, and that the police had used this loophole to constructively 
deny people their right to protest.  
 
Significance 
In this commentary, we argue that this judgment does not effectively protect 
the rights of peaceful assembly and expression. First, it suffers from the 
same weaknesses as the Mulundika judgment, in that it does not fully 
appreciate the nature of the right of assembly and the freedom of 
expression. Secondly, it does not adequately capture all aspects of 
constructive denial of freedom of expression that are brought about by the 
1996 amendment to the Public Order Act, specifically by Section 5(6), and 
its lack of guidelines for the police. This makes Section 5(6) fundamentally 
unconstitutional. The Court fails to realize that Section 5 (6) fundamentally 
operates as a limitation on the constitutional rights to peaceful assembly and 
expression. 
 
Weakness of the Mulundika Judgment Replicated 
The 1996 amendment to the Public Order Act did much to enhance the 
protection of the freedom of peaceful assembly and expression. The 
previous language in the Public Order Act empowered the police to control 
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who can talk at an assembly, the duration of the assembly, and the content 
that can be discussed at the assembly.1 These requirements were replaced 
under the 1996 amendment with new ones: all that is required is a 
notification to the police of the date, duration and location of the assembly, 
whether it be a static one or a demonstration/protest that follows a path.2 
However, there remained an undertone that the rights of peaceful assembly 
must be policed – that they are subject to the police’s ability to police them 
and that the police can deny or cancel a permit on the grounds that the 
police cannot police the assembly.3 This detracts from the fundamental 
nature of the right.  
 
The right of peaceful assembly is recognized as a fundamental right 
worldwide. Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) specifies that no restrictions may be placed on the right, 
except those that are “necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public 
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”4  
 
Similarly, Article 11 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
provides that:  
 
Every individual shall have the right to assemble freely with others. 
The exercise of this right shall be subject only to necessary restrictions 
provided for by law, in particular those enacted in the interest of 
national security, the safety, health, ethics and rights and freedoms of 
others.5 
 
As we demonstrate, there is consensus worldwide that the right to peaceful 
assembly and expression are fundamental to political speech. This is why 
they are viewed as fundamental in a democratic society, where views that 
may only be held by a minority may not find expression in other fora, 
leading to the necessity of peaceful assembly and expression within the 
                                                
1  Previous Section 5 (5) of the Public Order Act.  
2  Section 5 (5) as amended.  
3  This is the import of Section 5 (6) of the Public Order Act, which allows police 
to prohibit a public meeting because they are unable to police it.  
4  Article 21, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
5  African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 1979. 
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assembly. Legal restrictions or ‘clawbacks’6 are allowed in the interests of 
keeping the peace, protecting private property, or respecting the rights, and 
not merely the sensibilities, of other people.  
 
It is immediately noticeable that Section 5 of the Public Order Act, as 
amended, does not meet this threshold set out by the ICCPR. The language 
of Section 5 does not limit the restrictions to the freedom of assembly to 
only those “necessary” for national security or public safety, public order, 
health or morality. It is even more telling that the right of assembly in 
Article 21 (2) of the Constitution conforms to the ICCPR:  
(2)  Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be 
held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this Article to the 
extent that it is shown that the law in question makes provision –  
(a) that is reasonably required in the interests of defence, public 
safety, public order, public morality or public health;  
(b) that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting the rights 
or freedoms of other persons;  
 
Section 5 (6) of the Act simply states: “Where it is not possible for the 
Police to adequately police any particular public meeting,” the police may 
inform the conveners of their inability and suggest an alternative date. What 
is conspicuously missing from this Act is a provision that ensures that any 
restrictions to the freedom of assembly satisfy the conditions set out in 
Article 21 of the Constitution. The inability to police a public meeting is not 
one such restriction, in and of itself. It should be shown that should the 
meeting go on without police presence, there is a probability, more than a 
mere possibility, that there would be a breach of the peace as a result. The 
test is not subjective, nor one entirely for the police. It must be based on 
objective criteria. This is the tenor of the United Kingdom’s Public Order 
Act, which despite being similar to the Zambian Act in the requirement of 
notices to the police for public processions and assemblies, takes a more 
                                                
6  R. Goodrick, The Right of Peaceful Protest in International Law and Australian 
Obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=
rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiqjcSUrMbNAhWHKsAKHVIeC-
cQFggcMAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.humanrights.gov.au%2Fsites%2Fd
efault%2Ffiles%2FHRC_assembly_Goodrick.doc&usg=AFQjCNHysp6f_ekqm
HyT_qAUNMEcwqLQ8g&sig2=9YmMhfi91FqIvpQZLkC4Kw&bvm=bv.12559
6728,d.ZGg 
Muna Ndulo and Samuel Ndungu 
31 
 
serious view of the power of the police to stop a procession. Consider 
section 12 which provides: 
(1) If the senior police officer, having regard to the time or place at which 
and the circumstances in which any public procession is being held or 
is intended to be held and to its route or proposed route, reasonably 
believes that – 
(a)  it may result in serious public disorder, serious damage to 
property or serious disruption to the life of the community, or 
(b) the purpose of the persons organising it is the intimidation of 
others with a view to compelling them not to do an act they have 
a right to do, or to do an act they have a right not to do, he may 
give directions imposing on the persons organising or taking part 
in the procession such conditions as appear to him necessary to 
prevent such disorder, damage, disruption or intimidation, 
including conditions as to the route of the procession or 
prohibiting it from entering any public place specified in the 
directions.7 
 
This provision is grounded in the understanding that the right to peaceful 
assembly is indeed a fundamental right; and one that does not need the 
midwifery of the police. The police are allowed to step in where the 
assembly is, for serious reasons, suspected of not being peaceful. The police 
cannot prohibit an assembly solely on the ground that no permit was issued 
for the assembly. The assumption of the automatic need for a permit for 
assembly in the Public Order Act is therefore unwarranted and 
unconstitutionally abrogates the right to peaceful assembly.  
 
The mistake here is not just one for the legislature, though. The Supreme 
Court, both in the Mulundika case and in this case, has shown a somewhat 
short-sighted view of the fundamental nature of the right to peaceful 
assembly. In Mulundika, the provisions being subjected to constitutional 
scrutiny were egregious, and the Court was largely cognizant of this. 
However, it failed to recognize that the power to issue directions must be 
constrained by the conditions in the Constitution, namely, public peace, 
morality and the protection of the property and rights of other people. The 
Court proceeded on the assumption that police oversight into the exercise of 
this right was necessary. 
                                                
7  Public Order Act (UK), 1986, S. 12.  
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Although not guided by concern for the administrative consequences, we 
readily accept and acknowledge that there are many regulatory features in 
the Public Order Act which are perfectly constitutional and very necessary 
for the sake of public peace and order. This is common cause. For instance, 
there are subsections authorizing the issuing of directions and conditions for 
the purpose of regulating the route of a procession; the date, place and time 
of an assembly or a procession; their duration and any other matter designed 
to preserve public peace and order.  
 
However it appears that in the Court’s mind, peaceful assembly cannot be 
peaceful without police presence. The Court rightly upheld the requirement 
to give notice to the police of a public meeting, but wrongly attributed it to 
the need for the police to exercise a “regulatory function” over assemblies, 
stating that: “In this regard, we hold the view that the requirement for notice 
is necessary, as this is the only way that the police can perform their 
regulatory function and maintain law and order in our society”.8 The flaw in 
the conception of the fundamental nature of the right is revealed; the Court 
does not place the evidentiary burden on the police to show that they must 
regulate a public assembly. Regulation is seen as a foregone conclusion, a 
necessity for the enjoyment of the fundamental right. This therefore 
explains why the power granted to the police to cancel a public meeting and 
suggest a date in the near future because they (the police) cannot “regulate” 
it adequately, without necessarily showing that the inability to regulate 
would result in a breach of the peace, has gone unchecked.  
 
This question of whether the police should regulate at all in the interests of 
peace is seen in the EU case of Éva Molnár v Hungary.9 In interpreting 
Article 21 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Freedoms, which is identical to Article 21 of the Zambian Constitution, the 
Court held that there was no assumption that the policing of a peaceful 
assembly was required by the Constitution. Thus, the breaking up of a 
spontaneous peaceful assembly, for which notice could not be given, would 
be an unnecessary abrogation of the right to peaceful assembly: the Court 
stated:  
 
                                                
8  Law Society of Zambia v the Attorney General, Appeal No. SCZ/8/333/2013.  
9  Law Society of Zambia v the Attorney General, Appeal No. SCZ/8/333/2013.  
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[I]n special circumstances when an immediate response might be 
justified, for example in relation to a political event, in the form of a 
spontaneous demonstration, to disperse the ensuing demonstration 
solely because of the absence of the requisite prior notice, without any 
illegal conduct by the participants, may amount to a disproportionate 
restriction on freedom of peaceful assembly...It is important for the 
public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards 
peaceful gatherings if the freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 
11 of the Convention is not to be deprived of all substance.10 
 
The failure of the Supreme Court to appreciate the fundamental nature of 
the right to peaceful assembly further blinds it to another flaw in Section 5 
(5) (e) of the Public Order Act. This section outlines one of the conditions 
that the conveners of the public meeting have to meet, and which the police 
may rely upon to justify the cancellation of a planned public meeting. That 
section states that the “public meeting, procession or demonstration shall 
not create a risk to security or public safety, a breach of the peace or 
disaffection amongst the inhabitants of that neighbourhood [emphasis 
added].” The emphasized portion of the provision in effect gives the police 
the power to regulate the content of the opinions to be expressed at a public 
meeting. Had the Court appreciated the fundamental nature of the freedom 
of expression, it would have made it clear that such power is incompatible 
with the inalienable stature of a fundamental right. While a Constitution can 
limit the kinds of expression that are not protected – for example, libel and 
defamation11 – no such restrictions can be given for unpopular views. The 
freedom to air unpopular views is the very essence of the freedom of speech 
and assembly. Two American cases illustrate this. In Edwards v South 
Carolina,12 the US Supreme Court held that a State could not criminalize 
“the peaceful expression of unpopular views.” In National Socialist Party v 
Village of Skokie,13 the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois Supreme Court 
decision that would not ban the Nazi Party from organising a peaceful 
protest because of the content of their message. Closer to home, the Kenyan 
High Court, in a recent case, underscored the important part that the 
freedom of assembly plays in the ventilation of unpopular views:  
 
                                                
10  Application no. 10346/05, ECHR (7 January 2009). 
11  Article 21 (3) (b), Constitution of Zambia.  
12  372 US 229 (1963). 
13  473 US 43 (1977). 
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It may very well be that the opinion or view is an unpopular one with 
others but yet again, freedom of assembly merely provides an 
alternative form of participating in democracy to those who may be 
disenchanted and uninspired in one way or another. A minority may, 
for example, feel disappointed by their own failure to convince the 
majority. The alternative avenue for expressing their view would 
simply then be through demonstrations and picketing, even though the 
minority may still not have their way.14 
 
As has been argued elsewhere: 
 
Often a demonstration has significant publicity advantages over more 
conventional media of expression since it can attract extensive news 
coverage and widespread public interest; and for persons unpopular or 
unknown to the general public, or without financial resources, a 
demonstration may be the only effective means to publicize a message 
or reach a desired audience.15 
 
These views are in sharp contrast with the position in the Act and the 
position of the Zambian Supreme Court’s judgment in that the 
“disaffection” of locals in the locale of a planned protest is not grounds 
enough for the abrogation of a right, no matter how odious the opinion that 
causes the disaffection. The thrust of the Skokie decision is that freedom of 
expression and assembly are cornerstones of democracy, as they ensure that 
minority, unpopular views are not drowned by the hum of the majority. The 
police have an obligation to protect people expressing unpopular views.  
 
Unfettered Discretion of Police 
Section 5 of the Public Order Act outlines numerous conditions for the 
holding of an assembly, for instance, the applicants have to wait for police 
authorization before they can proceed to hold an assembly. Section 5 gives 
the police the absolute power of determining whether or not an assembly, 
meeting or procession should take place. The Supreme Court rightly stated 
that the right to assembly cannot be denied. However, the Court fails to 
identify that the right can still be abrogated if the police are allowed to 
cancel a public assembly without proper guidelines. The Court seems to 
                                                
14  Hon. Ferdinand Ndung’u Waititu & 4 others v The Attorney General & 9 
Others, Petition No. 169 of 2016, as per Onguto J.  
15  1967 HLR 1773. 
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think that it is clear from the Act that the reasons to be given for the 
cancellation of a peaceful assembly must comply with the Constitution. 
However, as already illustrated, the language of Section 5 of the Public 
Order Act expands the reasons for cancelling an assembly to beyond those 
given in the Constitution, namely, maintaining public peace and protecting 
the rights and properties of other people. In fact, the language of the Act 
does not even limit the reasons why the police can cancel a planned 
assembly – it only states that they can cancel an assembly out of an inability 
to police it. Apart from the foundational arguments already made, this 
scenario is clearly not envisaged by the Constitution – that an individual, 
whoever that might be, should be made the sole and unquestionable 
determinant of what is reasonably justifiable for the entire citizenry of 
Zambia. The Constitution does not in any way intend that the enjoyment of 
rights and freedoms enshrined by it in Articles 20, 21 and 28 be conditioned 
or contingent on the opinion of an official of the executive arm of 
government. A law which confers discretion on a public official, without 
indicating with sufficient precision the limits of that discretion, does not 
satisfy the quality of the ‘law’ contemplated in Article 21. 
 
This same view obtains in the Ghanaian Supreme Court. It held in New 
Patriotic Party vs. Attorney-General that “restrictions as are provided by 
Article 21(4) of the 1992 Constitution may be necessary from time to time 
and upon proper occasion. But the right to assemble, protest or demonstrate 
cannot be denied.”16 The Ghana Supreme Court nullified section 12 (a) of 
the Public Order Decree17 which gave police officers unfettered discretion 
to stop and cause to be dispensed with, any meetings or processions in any 
public place in contravention of Sections 7 and 8. It also nullified Section 
13(a) which made it an offence to hold such processions, meetings and 
public celebrations without permission. Similarly, the Court of Appeal in 
Nigeria, in Inspector-General of Police v. All Nigerian Peoples Party and 
Others, after holding the permit system under the Nigerian Public Order Act 
unconstitutional stated: “constitutions should be interpreted in such a 
manner as to satisfy the yearnings of the Nigerian Society.” The court 
observed: 
[The] Public Order Act should be promulgated to compliment section 
39 and 40 of the Constitution in context and not to stifle or cripple it. 
A rally or placard-carrying demonstration has become a form of 
                                                
16  1992-93 GBR 585-(2000) 2HBLRA, 1. 
17  Public Order Decree, 1972(NRCD) 
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expression of views on current issues affecting government and the 
governed in a sovereign state. It is a trend recognized and deeply 
entrenched in the system of governance in civilized countries. It will 
not only be primitive but also retrogressive if Nigeria continues to 
require a pass to hold a rally. We must borrow a leaf from those who 
have trekked the rugged path of democracy and are now reaping the 
dividend of their experience.18  
 
In re Munhumeso,19 the Zimbabwe Supreme Court held that powers placed 
in the hands of the police are arbitrary where (a) there is no criterion to be 
used to regulate the authority in the exercise of its discretion, (b) the 
regulating authority is not obliged to take into account whether the 
likelihood of a breach of peace could be averted by attaching conditions 
such as time, duration and route, and (c) it allows refusal of a permit even 
on the slightest possibility of breach of peace. This approach is supported by 
case law elsewhere in the world. In the US case of Shuttleworth v. 
Birmingham,20 the City Commission had been granted power by legislation, 
to refuse permission for a procession on such vague criteria as “public 
welfare, safety, health, decency and public morals.” The Court held that 
such power created an avenue for arbitrariness. It struck down the 
legislation. Similarly, in Gregory v. Florida21, a statute which gave the 
police almost unlimited discretion to decide whether or not demonstrators 
had committed a “diversion tending to a breach of peace” was declared an 
unconstitutional interference with the freedom of assembly. In 
Shuttleworth22, the Court stated that the test required for the restricting law 
is an objective one and should not depend on the subjective view or opinion 
of a police officer. 
 
The lack of a precise standard which the police must abide by when 
considering whether to abridge the right to peaceful assembly is therefore 
particularly damning. It makes Section 5 (6) of the Public Order Act open to 
arbitrary enforcement, as the police are not required explicitly by the Act to 
justify that their “inability to police” a planned public meeting or 
demonstration will lead to a breach of peace, should the planned meeting go 
                                                
18  (2) 18 NWLR 457 C.A. 
19  1994(1) ZLR 49(s). 
20  (1969) 394 US 147. 
21  (1969) 394 US 111. 
22  Supra note 17. 
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on without police supervision. This is contrary to Article 21 of the 
Constitution, and is not justifiable in an open and democratic country. 
 
The Supreme Court erred in finding that the only way Section 5 (6) of the 
Act offended the Constitution is by not providing a strict timeline for the 
police’s postponement of a planned meeting. In doing so, the Court 
validated the untenable situation where the police, in conforming to the Act, 
do not have to prove that a lack of police supervision of an event would 
probably lead to a breach of the peace. In addition, the police are 
empowered to cancel a planned meeting because of the potential that the 
planned protests may offend the sensibilities of the local residents – which 
in essence empowers the police to license the content of the message of the 
protest. The gravest error, however, lies in the Court’s misapprehension of 
the inalienable and fundamental nature of a fundamental human right. In the 
Court’s view, the midwifery of the right to peaceful assembly by the police 
is a foregone conclusion.  
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The Facts  
On 15 October 2010, the Appellant company, Nyimba Investments, obtained an 
insurance policy from Nico Insurance. The policy insured against risk on all real 
and personal property, and against business interruptions and the loss of profit 
of the Appellant and its group companies trading in Zambia. On 12 September 
2011, a fire gutted the property of the Appellant. At the time of the fire, the 
titleholders of the property were Gulam Ahmed Adam Patel and Ayyub Adam 
Patel who traded under the name: “Nyimba Filling Station and Supermarket”. 
The two were also shareholders in the Appellant company. 
 
The Appellant claimed on the policy for material damage, and the claim was 
settled by the Respondent, Nico Insurance. However, the claim for business 
interruption and loss of profit was later rejected by the Respondent when it 
was discovered that the destroyed property was not registered in the name of 
the Appellant Company, but instead in the names of two of its shareholders. 
The Respondent repudiated the policy for lack of insurable interest, refused to 
honour the claim for business interruption and loss of profit, and sought to 
recover the money it had already paid for material damage.  
 
The Appellant took the matter to the High Court. The High Court held that 
the Appellant made a representation that it owned the property that was the 
subject of the claim, when it did not in fact do so, and further that the 
Appellant's misrepresentation was fraudulent. This rendered the insurance 
policy void, and the claim on the policy untenable. It is against this 
judgment that the Appellant appealed. 
The legal issues to be determined could be summarized as follows: 
1. What constitutes an insurable interest? Is an insurable interest co-extensive 
with legal or equitable ownership of the subject matter of insurance? 
2. Is it misrepresentation, and therefore a breach of the duty of utmost 
good faith, for the insurer to insure the property as its own, when that 
property is in fact owned by the shareholders of the insured? 
3. Is an insurer who accepts and continues to accept premiums from the 
insured, while knowing that it is entitled to decline to insure the risk, or to 
repudiate a claim on account of breach of warranty or misrepresentation, 
estopped from pleading breach of warranty or misrepresentation?
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The Holding  
On Issue 1 above, the Supreme Court held that;  
(a) The insurable interest requirement does not necessarily require an 
insured to own the insured property outright. A less direct interest is 
enough. It may be enough that the insured is in possession of the 
property, or simply that it would suffer loss if the property were to be 
damaged.  
(b) The determination of insurable interest should depend on a careful 
reading of the contract of insurance in each case.  
(c) While authorities of apex courts in England will remain persuasive on 
courts in Zambia, authorities will not be applied without consideration 
of the circumstances in which they were decided.  
 
On Issue 2, the Court held that;  
(a) Insurance contracts are contracts of utmost good faith. Each party to 
the contract should not only disclose all the relevant information 
truthfully, but should also refrain from misleading the other party to 
the contract.  
(b) Misrepresentation must be material and must lead to inducement. 
(c) A misrepresentation is material if, first, it influences the prudent 
insurer’s decision to take up the risk, and second, if it influences the 
premium to be fixed for such risk. The test for materiality is an 
objective one made by reference to the attitude of a hypothetical 
prudent insurer. 
(d) A representation is influential if it weighs on the critical decision to 
insure or not to insure, and if to insure, on what terms. The insurer will 
only be entitled to avoid a policy if they can show that they were 
induced by the non-disclosure or misrepresentation by the insured, to 
enter into the contract. 
 
On Issue 3, the Court held that the issue of estoppel did not arise, given the 
Court’s finding that the Respondent was bound to honour the claim. 
 
Significance  
General  
The Court is to be commended for deviating from the narrow interpretation 
of insurable interest under English law as espoused in Macaura v. Northern 
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Assurance1 and Luceana v. Craufurd.2 Instead the Court leaned in favour of 
authorities that follow the reasonable expectancy theory and broad 
interpretation of insurable interest. The Court’s holding that the insured had 
an insurable interest, despite the fact that it had no legal title registered in its 
name, is sound.3 
 
Since insurance companies and underwriters do, in some cases, seek to 
evade their legal obligations on the grounds of a lack of an insurable 
interest, it is the duty of the Court to lean in favour of an insurable interest, 
where possible. After insurance companies have accepted premiums, the 
objection that there was no insurable interest is often a technical objection 
and one which has no real merit.4  
 
The above notwithstanding, the Court in its analysis of the Feasey v. Sun 
Life Assurance Company case, should have considered adopting Waller 
L.J.’s5 three-step test for the validity of a policy under the rules of insurable 
interest, which was laid down as: 
(a) What is the subject-matter of the policy?  
(b) What is the interest of the insured in the insured subject-matter? 
(c) Does the policy cover the assured’s interest?  
The adoption of the above test would have made future determination of 
matters dealing with insurable interest easier.  
                                                
1  (1925) A.C. 619 
2 (1802) 3 Bos & Pul. 75 
3  An insurable interest can be said to exist if: the assured has legal or equitable 
title to the subject matter; or if the assured is in possession of the subject matter; 
or if the assured is not in possession of the subject matter but may be either 
responsible for, or suffer loss in the event of, any damage to the subject matter. 
Glengate-KG Properties Limited v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society 
Limited (1999) 2 All E.R. 487 Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Corporation of 
Canada (2003) Lloyds Rep. I.R 637. Though in Sharp v Sphere Drake Insurance 
(1992) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 501, the court rejected the view that insurable interest had 
to be based upon the assured being the equitable or legal owner of the property 
in question, and held that an insurable interest in property might arise merely 
because the assured owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in respect of the 
property. 
4  Brett M.R in Stock v Inglis (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 564, affirmed (1885) L.R. 10 App. 
Cas 263; Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada (2003) Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 
637 
5  Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 637 
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The Time When an Insurable Interest Must Exist 
The Court at pages J44 to J46, reviewed the policy document and arrived at 
the conclusion that the Appellant was within the contemplation of insurable 
interest under the definition of “property insured” in the policy document. 
The Court did not address in detail nor provide guidance on the time when 
an insurable interest must exist. However, inference from the decision 
shows that it must exist at the time of contract.  
 
Different jurisdictions have taken different views on the timing question. 
The opinions from the majority of the American courts hold that insurance 
on property is valid when an insurable interest in the property exists at the 
time of the loss.6 The basis of this position is that if the loss only occurs to 
the insured with an insurable interest in the damaged property, then no loss 
can exist when the property lacks the prerequisite insurable interest at the 
time of the loss.7 Common law courts however, appear to have never 
reached consensus on whether the insurable interest must exist at the time of 
contract formation. In Sadlers Co. v. Badcockk8 the court held that the 
insured must have an insurable interest in the property both at the time of 
contract formation and at the time of loss.9 
 
In addition, the premium is recognized as an insurer’s consideration for 
assuming the insured’s risk in exchange for the insurer’s obligation to pay 
proceeds.10The consideration may fail, however, if the insurer assumes no 
risk at the time the premiums are paid because, even though the insurer 
promises to insure against the risk of loss, the insured risk does not exist 
until the insured actually obtains insurable interest.11 Given that the 
insurable interest is an essential element for the valuable consideration of an 
insured’s payment of premium, requiring its existence only at the time of 
                                                
6  Washington University Global Studies Law Review Vol. 10 Issue 4 - 749 
7  E.g., Dairyland Ins. Co v. Hawkwin, 292 F. Supp. 947, 951 (S.D. Iowa 1968) as 
cited in the Washington University Global Studies Law Review Vol. 10 749 
(finding insurers could not deny coverage on grounds that insured, who was 
listed as owner, had no insurable interest because, even though the insured’s 
son-in-law possessed the car and the insured intended to transfer ownership to 
the son-in-law when insured received payment, a bona fide sale had not occurred 
at the time of loss). 
8  2 Atk. 544, 26 ER 733 (1743).  
9  Robert Jerry II, Understanding Insurance Law; 43 (2nd ed. 1996) 
10  The Washington University Global Studies Law Review Vol. 10 749 
11  Ibid. 
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loss materially therefore conflicts with the general principle of contract 
law.12 In Germany for instance, the legislators there have endorsed the 
principle that the insurable interest must exist through the entire duration of 
the insurance contract. Article 80 of the German Insurance Contract Act for 
example provides that “the policyholder shall not be obligated to pay 
insurance premium if no insured interest exists when the insurance cover 
[age] commences.” The Zambian Insurance Act is silent on this issue, and 
the Court did not clearly address this in its judgment.  
 
An insurable interest can be said to exist if: the assured has legal or 
equitable title to the subject matter; or if the insured is in possession of the 
subject matter; or if the insured is not in possession of the subject matter but 
may be either responsible for, or suffer loss in the event of, any damage to 
the subject matter. Glengate-KG Properties Limited v Norwich Union Fire 
Insurance Society Limited (1999) 2 All E.R. 487 Feasey v Sun Life 
Assurance Corporation of Canada (2003) Lloyds Rep. I.R 637. Though in 
Sharp v Sphere Drake Insurance (1992) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 501, the Court 
rejected the view that insurable interest had to be based upon the insured 
being the equitable or legal owner of the property in question, and held that 
an insurable interest in property might arise merely because the assured 
owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in respect of the property. 
 
Overall, the Court’s disposal of the issues was sound, and in accordance 
with long established principals of law. In developing their analysis, the 
Court provided a useful historical analysis of the concept of insurable 
interest, and undertook a cross jurisdictional comparison of how apex courts 
in other jurisdictions have, in recent times, dealt with the subject of 
insurable interest. The ambiguity on timing notwithstanding, the broader 
construction of the concept of insurable interest is a welcome development.  
 
                                                
12  Malcom Clarke, Policies and Perceptions of Insurance Law in the Twenty-First 
Century 36 (2007). 
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DH Brothers Industries (PTY) Limited vs. Olivine Industries (PTY) 
Limited (Appeal No. 74/2010) [2012] ZMSC 17 
Chanda N. Tembo 
 
The Facts 
The Respondent, Olivine Industries, applied to the Registrar of Trade Marks 
(The “Registrar”) for the registration of the mark ‘Daily’ under Class 3 of 
the Trade Marks Act.1 The registration was with respect to “its bleaching 
preparations and other substances for laundry use such as cleaning, 
polishing and abrasive preparations, soaps, perfumery, essential oils, 
cosmetics, hair lotion and dentifrices.”2 The Appellant, DH Brothers, 
opposed the Respondent’s application on the grounds that the Appellant was 
the true proprietor of the mark “Daily”. The Appellant also advanced the 
“prior use” argument, noting that it had been using the unregistered mark 
since 2003. Deciding in favour of the Respondent, the Registrar allowed the 
registration of the mark on the ground that the Appellant’s mark was not 
registered under the Act, and was therefore not entitled to protection under 
the Act. This was notwithstanding the fact that the Appellant demonstrated 
prior use of the mark ‘Daily’ for a similar class of goods.  
 
Aggrieved by this decision, The Appellant appealed to the High Court. The 
High Court upheld the Registrar’s decision. The Appellant then appealed to 
the Supreme Court. 
 
The Holding  
The crux of the Registrar’s decision, as upheld by the High Court and by the 
Supreme Court, was that the Act does not offer protection to unregistered 
marks, and that consequently, the proprietor of an unregistered mark cannot 
prevent the registration of a similar or identical mark under the Trade Mark 
Act. An aggrieved proprietor of an unregistered mark can therefore not 
invoke Sections 16 and 17 of the Act.3 Section 16 pertains to the prohibition  
                                                
1  Cap 401 of the Laws of Zambia (The “Act”). 
2  Class 3, Classification of Goods, The Fourth Schedule to the Act 
3  In this case the Supreme Court refused to accept the argument made by the 
Appellant that relied on an English case, The Trade Marks Act, 1938 and Koyo 
Seiko Kabushiki Kaisha’s in the Reports of Patent, Design and Trade Mark 
Cases, vol. LXX1 No.19, London, 1954. In that case, it was held that a 
corresponding Section 11 of the United Kingdom Trade Marks Act (which was 
transplanted into the Zambia Trade Mark Act unchanged as Section 16) was 
available to proprietors of an unregistered mark, while section 12 under the 1938 
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of the registration of marks that are likely to deceive or confuse consumers 
or the general public in the course of trade,4 while Section 17 provides for 
the prohibition of the registration of marks with respect to any goods or the 
description of goods that are identical or closely resemble a mark already 
registered under the Act.5 
 
Of central concern in this commentary is Section 7 of the Act, the section on 
which the courts based their decision. Section 7 provides that “no person 
shall be entitled to institute any proceedings to prevent or to recover 
damages for the infringement of an unregistered trade mark, but nothing in 
this Act shall be deemed to affect rights of action against any person for 
passing off goods as the goods of another person or the remedies in respect 
thereof.”6  
 
Significance: Key Unresolved Questions  
Marks Capable of Registration 
In considering the question of which marks are eligible for registration 
under the Act, the Supreme Court should have drawn its mind to the 
question of whether the mark “Daily”, a common English word of keen use, 
was registrable under the Act. Before delving into a more detailed 
consideration of this issue, it is important to consider what a mark is.7 The 
                                                                                                    
Act (which corresponds with Section 17 of the Zambian Act) was only available 
to proprietors of registered marks. The Supreme Court in the case in casu on the 
contrary held the view that the whole Act was not available or applicable, unless 
as expressly provided, to unregistered marks. It must be noted that the Trade 
Mark Act of the United Kingdom of 1938 (available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1938/22/pdfs/ukpga_19380022_en.pdf) 
was repealed and replaced in 1994 by the British Trade Marks Act of 1994 
(available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=127270).  
4  Section 16, of the Act; this is because trade marks as economic tools are 
conveyors of economic information regarding the quality or other attributes of 
goods or services being sold so as to facilitate purchase decisions in the course 
of trade. See B. G. Ramello, (2006) ‘What is in a Sign? Trademark Law and 
Economic Theory?’Journal of Economic Surveys 20, 4, 547-565, 549; Deceiving 
or confusing consumers in the course of trade are therefore likely to prejudice 
the economic interests of the proprietor of the legitimate and registered mark. 
5  Ibid, Section 17 
6  Section 7, of the Act; See also Section 2(1) of the UK Trade Mark Act of 1994 
and Section 27(1) and (2) of the Indian Trade Mark Act of 1999 
7  A trade mark is defined as a mark, “except in relation to certification marks, 
which is used or proposed to be used in relation to goods for purposes of 
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Act establishes a Register of trade marks which is divided into four parts: 
Part A, Part B, Part C and Part D.8 A mark is capable of registration under 
any of these parts if it has some element of distinctiveness. In the context of 
trade mark law, ‘distinctiveness’ is the ability to distinguish and 
differentiate the goods and services of one business from competing 
businesses.9 
 
The degrees of distinctiveness varies between the four parts, particularly 
between Part A and Part B. Section 15 of the Act requires that marks 
registerable under Part B of the Trademark Register: 
 
must be capable, in relation to the goods in respect of which it is 
registered or proposed to be registered, of distinguishing goods 
with which the proprietor of the trade mark is or may be connected 
in the course of trade, from goods in the case of which no such 
connection subsists, either generally or, where the trade mark is 
registered or proposed to be registered subject to limitations, in 
relation to use within the extent of the registration.10  
 
This means that a mark’s ability to distinguish can increase with use over 
time. However, for trademarks registerable under Part A of the Act, the 
ability to distinguish is higher, because the Act requires that these marks 
must be inherently distinct or inherently capable of distinguishing goods of 
competing businesses. This means that the mark ‘Daily’, unless modified 
through fancy representation for instance, would not qualify for registration 
under Part A of the Register. It follows however that the mark ‘Daily,’ 
                                                                                                    
indicating for, or so as to indicate, a connection in the course of trade between 
the goods and some person having the right either as proprietor or as a 
registered user to use the mark, whether with or without any indication of the 
identity of the person.” (Section 2 of the Act); marks which are defined as 
including a “device, brand, heading, label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter, 
numerical or a combination thereof.” (Section 2 of the Act) 
8  Ibid, Section 6(2) 
9  A. Taubman, et al., (2012) A Handbook on the WTO TRIPS Agreement. 
Cambridge University Press, 57; Section 14(2) of the Act states that a trade mark 
is said to be distinctive if it is “adapted in relation to goods in respect of which a 
trademark is registered or proposed to be registered, to distinguish goods with 
which the proprietor of the trademark is or may be connected in the course of 
trade …”  
10  Ibid, Section, 15 
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being less distinctive, would most likely be eligible for registration under 
Part B of the Register.  
 
The Availability for Registration of Common Words under the Trademarks 
Act 
One of the key functions of a trademark is to minimise the cost of 
information in the course of trade.11 By branding goods and services, 
trademarks act as communication tools. Common nouns and adjectives are 
generally said to be ‘inappropriable’ through trademark and therefore 
available for all businesses to use in the course of trade. If common words 
were permitted to be monopolised through appropriation in the course of 
trade, this would increase the cost of information for other businesses, who 
must in turn find alternative expressions through words or signs to identify 
goods and services. In the course of its decision, the Court should have 
applied its mind to the question of whether “Daily” was a common word, 
and if so, whether it was capable of registration.  
 
Common words in trademark law are also known as generic words or 
marks. Something is said to be generic or common if it is “shared by, 
including or typical of a group of people.”12 Common words are therefore 
unavailable for monopolisation since the words are available for all to use. 
From a legal standpoint, no one person or business has the right to 
appropriate a common or generic word and stop others from using that word 
in the course and scope of their business. The law however, does provide an 
exception. If a party wishes to register a common or generic mark, the 
Registrar will require the proprietor of the mark to enter a disclaimer 
notifying the public that the proprietor is aware that the proprietor has no 
exclusive right or monopoly over the common word, and thus has no right 
to restrict or prevent others in Zambia from utilising the generic word.13 In 
Zambia a good example of disclaimers applied to common words would 
relate to the common word ‘Manzi’ in the trade mark ‘ManziValley’ owned 
by Natural Valley Limited. ‘Manzi’ in some local Zambian languages 
literally means water. ‘Water’ or ‘Manzi’ are both common words that, 
unless adapted for instance through fanciful writing, are not available for 
absolute appropriation or monopolisation through trademarks.  
                                                
11  Ramello B.G. (2006) ‘What is in a Sign? Trademark Law and Economic 
Theory.’ Journal of Economic Surveys 20, 4, 547-565; 552 
12  Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. (2006) 620 
13  See Sections 19, 36, and 39(1)(e) of the Act 
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Should Passing Off be Pleaded Specifically in an Opposition Action? 
This case raised both substantive and procedural issues. Substantively, 
while the proper court of first instance was indeed the High Court, the 
action brought by the Appellant was defective because as stated above, 
Section 7 of the Act bars any action brought under the Act that relates to an 
unregistered mark. From a procedural perspective, the initial action was 
defective because the action was improperly brought before the courts. This 
is because passing off has to be pleaded as a common law tort and not under 
the Trade Marks Act.  
 
In addition, there is unanimous precedent that states that where 
commencement of a civil matter is prescribed by law, commencement of 
proceedings must conform to the prescribing law.14 Thus, where a litigant 
departs from the prescription of law with regard to the mode of 
commencing an action, such commencement must be treated as defective. 
This means that passing off has to be specifically pleaded as a common law 
tort under a separate action against the infringing party in accordance with 
the High Court Rules. The court should have guided the Appellant to this 
effect. 
 
Conclusion  
All in all, the Court’s decision might have been a more effective 
development of intellectual property law if it had considered the unresolved 
issues above. 
 
 
                                                
14 Newplast Industries V the Commissioner of Lands and the Attorney General. 
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The Facts 
Three Applicants stood charged before the Livingstone Subordinate Court 
with twenty-five counts relating to corrupt practices under the Zambian 
Anti-Corruption Act No. 3 of 2012. When the matter came up for trial, the 
prosecutor presented a nolle prosequi to discontinue the criminal 
proceedings. The defence objected to the discontinuance of the proceedings 
in such a manner, arguing that the entry of the nolle prosequi did not meet 
the conditions set out in Article 180(4)(c) and (7) of the Constitution as 
amended, since no reasons were given to the Court for the discontinuation 
of proceedings. Consequently, the defence requested an interpretation of the 
impugned provisions by the Constitutional Court. 
 
The issue for determination was whether the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) still has unfettered powers to discontinue criminal proceedings pursuant 
to Articles 180(4)(c) and (7) of the Constitution, since the amendment of the 
Constitution by the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016. 
 
The Holding 
By a majority of four to one (Munalula JC dissenting), the Constitutional 
Court held that once the DPP informs the Court of his intention to 
discontinue proceedings pursuant to Article 180(4)(c), the Court cannot 
object to that exercise of power nor can it ask the DPP to furnish it with 
reasons for the discontinuation. Therefore, the DPP has unfettered discretion 
to discontinue criminal proceedings.  
 
Significance 
The judgment is significant in that it is the first application of Article 128 
(2): “where a question relating to this Constitution arises in a court, the 
person presiding in that court shall refer the question to the Constitutional 
Court.” That notwithstanding, the Constitutional Court’s decision is 
unsatisfactory for its defiance of the basic approaches in constitutional 
adjudication, and for its dearth in legal analysis, leaving one with the sense 
that a critical opportunity to expand constitutional law was lost.  
 
In determining how to interpret the Constitution, the Constitutional Court 
claimed to be restating the principles applicable in constitutional 
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interpretation in Zambia as well as in other jurisdictions. According to the 
Court, the correct approach is the literal rule of interpretation, which literal 
interpretation should only be vacated when it leads to an absurdity. This 
approach is, however, problematic. Judges are required to justify their 
decisions. As constitutional scholar Robert Post argues, “judges must be 
able to explain why they have decided to interpret the Constitution through 
one set of inquiries rather than another.”1 The reasons advanced by the 
Constitutional Court for choosing the literal rule have no merit and in fact, it 
is respectfully submitted, the use of the literal approach in constitutional 
adjudication is unconstitutional. 
 
The Constitution was, save for the Bill of Rights, overhauled in the 2016 
amendment. Article 1 of the Constitution declares the Constitution supreme. 
Therefore, any law or practice contradicting it is, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, invalid. Article 267(1) of the Constitution provides in 
mandatory terms how the Constitution shall be interpreted, stating that: 
This Constitution shall be interpreted in accordance with the Bill of Rights 
and in a manner that:- 
(a) Promotes its purpose, values and principles; 
(b) Permits the development of the law; and 
(c) Contributes to good governance. 
 
Further, Article 8 of the Constitution provides for national values, which 
include democracy and constitutionalism, social justice, good governance 
and integrity. Article 9 makes it mandatory for a court to apply these values 
in interpreting the Constitution and other laws. It must be noted that these 
provisions were borrowed from the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, word for 
word. The significance of these provisions, as the then Kenyan Chief Justice 
Willy Mutunga stated, is that “the Constitution is complete with its mode of 
its interpretation.”2 The Constitution being self-contained with tools for its 
interpretation, and these provisions being mandatory, there was no legal 
basis for the Constitutional Court’s reversion to the common law in order to 
circumvent the theory of interpretation required by the very Constitution. 
Surprisingly, the Constitutional Court seemed to be unaware of these 
                                                
1  Robert Post, (1990) “Theories of Constitutional Interpretation.” Yale Law 
Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 209. 
2  In the Matter of the Principles of Gender Representation in the National 
Assembly and Senate Advisory Opinion No. 2 of 2012. 
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provisions as nowhere in the majority judgment does the Court make 
reference to them. South African Constitutional Court Judge, Kentridge J, 
rightly stated that when a court ignores the language of the law giver, what 
results “is not interpretation but divination.”3 
 
Articles 8, 9 and 267 of the Constitution, which provide for its construction 
are value laden, entailing that constitutional interpretation is teleological 
and not mechanical. It should be geared towards realization of those 
constitutional values, standards and collective aspirations of the people. 
Invariably, only a purposive interpretation is consistent with this standard 
the Constitution has set for its interpretation. Contrary to the assertion of the 
Constitutional Court that the literal rule is the approach to interpretation 
taken in many jurisdictions, the purposive approach is actually the standard 
in countries with written constitutions.4 Former Judge of the South African 
Constitutional Court Mahomed J, considers a purposive and generous 
interpretation of the Constitution as an “international culture of 
constitutional jurisprudence.”5 This, as stated in a Namibian case, is the 
standard way of interpreting the constitution: 
 
A constitution is an organic document. Although it is enacted in the 
form of a statute it is sui generis. It must be broadly, liberally and 
purposively interpreted so as to avoid the austerity of tabulated 
legislation and so as to enable it to continue to play a creative and 
dynamic role in the expression and achievement of the ideals and 
aspirations of the nation, in the articulation of the values bonding its 
people and disciplining its government.6 
                                                
3  Zuma and Two Others v The State, Case No. CCT/5/94. 
4  See the following case examples: Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v The 
Minister of Health of the Republic of South Africa and Another, Case No. 
CCT/27/03; In the Matter of the Principle of Gender Representation in the 
National Assembly and Senate Advisory Opinion No. 2 of 2012; Democratic 
Alliance v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (2016) ZACC 8; 
Economic Freedom Fighters v Speakers of the National Assembly and Others 
(2016) ZACC 11; State v Makwanyane and Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94; 
Mhlungu and Four Others v State , Case No. CCT/25/94; Republic of Namibia 
and Another v Cultura 2000 and Another 1994 (1) SA 407; Zuma and two others 
v The State, Case No. CCT/5/94. 
5  Mhlungu and Four Others v State, Case No. CCT/25/94. 
6  Government of the Republic of Namibia and Another v Cultura 2000 and 
Another 1994(1) SA 407. 
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In holding that the DPP enjoys absolute discretion in discontinuing criminal 
proceedings, the Court also relied on the legislative history of the provision. It 
noted that the first draft Constitution of 2012 had provisions that trammelled 
the discretion of the DPP, but that these provisions were removed in the final 
draft, and therefore, the framers of the Constitution never intended the DPP’s 
discretion to be constrained. Again, this approach is by itself, an impoverished 
approach to the determination of a constitutional matter. While understanding 
the decisions and choice of words used by framers of the Constitution is 
important in order to understand the larger context and meaning of specific 
words, that in itself should not be determinative of a constitutional issue. This 
is because, logically, the Constitution is not the product of the few individuals 
who framed it, but is, in the words of Mahomed AJ, “a mirror reflecting the 
national soul, the identification of the ideals and aspirations of a nation; the 
articulation of the values bonding its people.”7 A constitution, therefore, 
should not be interpreted simply to reflect its drafting history but to reflect the 
collective values and ideals of the people. Interpretation should be forward 
and not backwards looking. Chaskalson P, the former President of the South 
African Constitutional Court, once stated that a constitution should be 
interpreted as the product of a “multiplicity of persons” and therefore “caution 
is called for in respect of the comments of individual actors in the process, no 
matter how prominent a role they might have played.”8 The views of the 
Technical Committee that drafted the 2016 Constitution should, therefore, not 
have been determinative of the outcome of the Court’s decision. 
 
Taking a literal approach, the Court considered Article 180(4) (c) as giving 
the DPP unfettered discretion to discontinue criminal proceedings at any 
stage before judgment is delivered. In light of this approach, the Court has 
no oversight role to play in the manner in which the DPP exercises his/her 
discretion. In the view of the majority, this position is consistent with 
Article 180(7) which states that the DPP shall not be subject to the direction 
or control of a person or an authority in the discharge of his/her office. 
 
However, a careful reading of the Constitution shows no merit in this 
position. First, Article 180(7) has a qualification to the effect that in the 
discharge of his/her duty, the DPP “shall have regard to the public interest, 
administration of justice, the integrity of the judicial system and the need to 
avoid abuse of the legal process.” It is obvious that this qualification is a fetter 
                                                
7  The State v Achesou 1991(2) SA 805 (NM). 
8  The State v Makwanyane and Mchunu, Case No. CCT/3/94, para 18. 
Milford Maambo and Others v The People 
52 
on the manner in which the DPP exercises discretion. If he/she contravenes 
these standards, he/she would be acting unconstitutionally. But not so for the 
Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court simply considered this 
qualification as a mere guide to the Director of Public Prosecutions “in the 
performance of the functions of that office.” The Court, however, gave no 
reasons for making that conclusion. The decision of the Constitutional Court 
is further contradicted by Article 267(4) which clearly states: 
 
A provision of this Constitution to the effect that a person, an authority 
or institution is not subject to the direction or control of a person or 
authority in the performance of a function, does not preclude a Court 
from exercising jurisdiction in relation to a question as to whether that 
person, authority or institution has performed the function in 
accordance with this Constitution or other laws. 
 
The net effect of Article 267(4) is that as long as the DPP derives his/her 
authority from the Constitution, the manner in which he/she exercises that 
power cannot escape the scrutiny of the Court as the guardian of the 
Constitution and the rule of law. The exercise of any power that issues 
under the Constitution is subject to constitutional control and judicial 
oversight. This is the standard approach in a constitutional democracy. 
Power is never arbitrary. As the South African Constitutional Court stated, 
where power derives from the constitution, its exercise must be “rationally 
related to the purpose for which power was given.”9 
 
Recent jurisprudence from the South African Supreme Court of Appeal is 
squarely in line with this view. On the powers of the DPP, the South African 
Constitution has comparable provisions to the Zambian Constitution. The 
South African National Prosecution Authority had, in 2009, dropped charges 
against President Zuma, and it was argued by the prosecution that this was 
within its discretion. The court rejected this argument. 
 
Finally, back to basics. The majority of the Constitutional Court held that 
the DPP has unfettered discretion to discontinue proceedings at any stage 
before judgment is delivered. But is “unfettered discretion” tenable in law? 
What exactly is discretion? Ronald Dworkin, addressed the concept of 
                                                
9  Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v The Minister of Health of the Republic 
of South Africa and Another, Case CCT/27/04. 
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discretion in his theory of adjudication.10 The word discretion is 
appropriately used in one context only, that is, when a person is in general 
charged with making decisions which are subject to standards set by a 
particular authority. As Dworkin states, “discretion, like the hole in a 
doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of 
restriction.” Discretion therefore, at least in law, is always relative to the 
power under which it is given. Otherwise it does not exist. According to 
Dworkin, it is always legitimate to ask: “discretion under which standards?” 
or, “discretion as to which authority?” If, therefore, someone can do as they 
please, that is not discretion. It is simply lawlessness.  
 
                                                
10  Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co, 
1986) 14-34. 
